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ABSTRACT 
Modern warfare in general, and targeted killing (TK) in particular, challenge 
conventional legal paradigms. While some contend that targeted killing is a clear violation of 
law, others argue that it is the law that should adapt to its modern context. In this thesis, I argue 
in favor of the latter. I will first explain the two dominant paradigms through which one can 
interpret TK: law enforcement versus armed conflict, going on to argue that an armed conflict 
paradigm can be legitimately invoked. In sections IV and V, I examine the rights and status of 
targeted individuals in modern conflict. I will then explore Jeremy Waldron’s objection to TK—
that its potential for abuse outweighs its utility. I conclude by arguing that TK, like all warfare, is 
justified only by the unacceptability of its alternative, and that the justification of all warfare 
abides under the same pragmatic presumption.  
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I Introduction 
 
The law that governs armed conflict today was written to apply to war as it used to be. It 
evolved in a time when nation fought against nation, and when political boundaries and uniforms 
gave scope and shape to conflict. When the laws of war are applied in this context, they fulfill 
their function, but the conflict in which we are engaged today differs significantly from this 
paradigm. With the 21
st
 Century has come the rise of the non-state actor in global conflict—a 
development that has already drastically changed the face of combat. This new entity challenges 
the categories and norms defined by the Geneva Conventions, and today we are left either to 
force new concepts into an outdated paradigm or to frantically amend international law. While it 
may be unreasonable to demand rapid innovation to a body of law that has roots stretching 
centuries deep, I nevertheless maintain that this is the only acceptable course of action: 
Innovation in the law of armed conflict must reflect the change in the realities of war today.  
The controversy generated by the novelties in modern warfare comes sharply into focus 
with regard to the issue of targeted killing (TK). Many argue that existing legal rules should be 
applied in a straightforward manner, which would render TK an illegitimate tactic.
1
 Others 
contend that modern developments in warfare and the rise of the non-state organization as a 
threat to national security present challenges that existing law is inadequate to address.
2
 The 
focus of this thesis will be the legal and ethical implications of this tactic as it is executed in a 
modern context. In section II I will explain the two dominant paradigms through which one can 
                                                          
1
 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
Addendum : Study on targeted killings, 28 May 2010, A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c0767ff2.html [accessed 14 September 2013] (Hereafter referred to as: HRC, Study 
on targeted killings). 
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 Geoffrey Corn, "Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category 
of Armed Conflict," Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 40, no. 2 (2007). 
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interpret TK: law enforcement versus armed conflict. If we seek to target individuals pursuant to 
some supposed legal or moral guilt, then we necessarily invoke a law enforcement paradigm and 
cannot avoid its demand for due process. If TK can be justified, it must be done through appeal 
to armed conflict—that is to say, to the idea that the context in which TK is carried out 
constitutes, not the normal law enforcement setting of peacetime, but rather one of armed 
conflict, in which the less stringent humanitarian norms of war apply. In section III I explore the 
definition of armed conflict in the Geneva Convention and its application to modern warfare, 
concluding that it is reasonable to apply the norms and rights of armed conflict to the situations 
in which TK is used: those situations are properly categorized as forms of armed conflict to 
which the Geneva Conventions apply, and so we must determine the rights afforded to potential 
victims of drone strikes. In section IV I examine the implications for TK of international human 
rights law. This discussion will center around the relationship between International Human 
Rights Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Furthermore, because modern 
conflict has cast the conventional civilian/combatant dichotomy into question, a critique of 
international law with regard to these categories is developed in section V. Lastly, I examine 
Jeremy Waldron’s objection to TK—that its potential for abuse outweighs its utility.3 I reply that, 
while he succeeds in showing that government must target with extreme caution, he fails in 
rejecting targeted killing per se. I conclude by arguing that TK, like all warfare, is justified only 
by the unacceptability of its alternative. This is admittedly a pragmatic approach, but the 
justification of all armed conflict and the law governing it operate on the same pragmatic 
assumption.  
                                                          
3
 Jeremy Waldron, "Justifying Targeted Killing with a Neutral Principle?," in Targeted Killings: Law and Morality 
in an Asymmetrical World, ed. Jens David Ohlin Claire Finkelstein, and Andrew Altman(Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
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“Terrorism” and “targeted killing” are nebulous terms that warrant specification. The 
definition of the former is easily stretched for rhetorical and political purposes. “Terrorism” can 
connote anything from acts that are morally distasteful to genuine moral atrocities, such as 
Timothy McVeigh’s Oklahoma City bombing or the 9/11 attacks. “Targeted killing,” is similarly 
broad. While it is generally used to refer to the killing of identified members of terrorist 
organizations by drones, there is no reason to confine the concept to use only when used against 
members of terrorist organizations or only by drones. For the purposes of this thesis, I will 
borrow the definition used by Andrew Altman in his introduction to Targeted Killings: Law and 
Morality in an Asymmetrical World. Terrorism is “those acts undertaken with the intent (and 
realistic possibility) of killing in a single episode of violence a number of civilians for the 
purpose of advancing certain political goals by intimidating (a certain segment of) the 
population.”4 A terrorist would be a member of an organization that plans such acts. Targeted 
killing is “the intentional killing by a state of an individual identified in advance and not in the 
state’s custody.”5 Notably, there is nothing in this definition that specifies that targeted killing 
must be accomplished by drones.  My argument and the arguments of the source material are 
made primarily in reference to targeted killing by drones, though, strictly speaking, any 
justification of targeted killing as defined must apply to targeted killing by other means as well.  
II Two Paradigms of Analysis 
 
Traditionally, there are two modes of evaluating targeted killing. We may view them as 
the models of either law enforcement or war. In war, enemy combatants may be killed without 
appeal to any sort of due process. As far as the Laws of Armed Conflict are concerned, to the 
                                                          
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid. 
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extent that individuals are enemy combatants, lethal force can legally be applied. Viewing 
targeted killing in terms of law enforcement, on the other hand, invokes an entirely different set 
of assumptions. In law enforcement, any “target” is suspected of some sort of legal guilt.6 
Determining this guilt requires due process. Failure to provide this process to a “target” (i.e., 
simply killing them) is a moral atrocity that cannot stand.  
Under the armed conflict paradigm, enemy combatants are targeted solely in virtue of 
their status as enemy combatants.
7
 Whether by an infantryman aiming a rifle or a pilot firing a 
missile, the enemy is justifiably targeted inasmuch as he is wearing a uniform and operating 
under a command structure of an enemy force. Granted, there are further qualifications for 
targeting a uniformed combatant (it is illegal to target and kill the wounded, POWs, hors de 
combat, etc.). Nevertheless, when combatants are targeted in armed conflict, there is no need to 
justify the application of force on a case-by-case basis. In theory, declaring war against an enemy 
in the first place is justified by jus ad bellum considerations. But any subsequent application of 
force to that enemy is legally justifiable regardless of whether the war itself is justified: all that is 
required is that a state of armed conflict exists and the targeted individual is a member of or 
directly and significantly contributes to the enemy military threat. Thus, it is not the conduct of 
the targeted individual that makes him a permissible target, but rather his status as a member of 
the enemy force.  
                                                          
6
 Michael L. Gross, "Assassination and Targeted Killing: Law Enforcement, Execution or Self-Defence?," Journal 
of Applied Philosophy 23, no. 3 (2006). 
7
 Geoffrey Corn, "Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights Norms to 
Armed Conflict," International Humanitarian Legal Studies, (2010). p 30. 
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Arguing in favor of the war paradigm, Daniel Statman points out that theories of just war 
endorse the use of targeted killing.
8
 Killing the enemy is obviously accepted in war, and targeted 
killing is merely another tactic used pursuant to that end. The fact that the enemy might hide 
among a civilian population does not suddenly strip a military force of its right to seek and 
eliminate the threat that the enemy poses. As Statman claims, 
 Opponents of TK are shocked by the apparent ease by which countries like 
the United States or Israel “execute” people with nothing remotely close to due 
process, and with no need to establish imminent danger or individual 
responsibility. From the perspective of domestic law-enforcement, this is indeed 
shocking. But from the perspective of war it is not shocking at all. This is 
precisely what war is about—killing enemy combatants with no due process and 
with hardly any constraints whatsoever.
9
  
 
But there is something troublesome about the very notion of targeting that Statman fails 
to address. Targeting a specific person—naming a name—is not done without imputing guilt to 
the target.
10
 Part of our justification of targeting terrorists is the presumption that the target is 
responsible for the killing of innocent civilians or some other moral atrocity. One can hardly 
avoid the intuitive assumption that we target individuals (terrorists) on account of their conduct. 
Terrorism is illegal and terrorists are criminals. If targeted killing is seen in this light, the 
elimination of the targets would be seen as moral retribution or the pursuit of justice rather than 
merely attacking the enemy in the conventional context. This presumption of moral guilt would 
force us to embrace the law-enforcement paradigm again, making the elimination of the guilty 
via TK an unacceptable course of action.
11
 Due process is needed to determine whether or not 
our moral or legal accusations are warranted. Only after this may we presume to take 
                                                          
8
 Daniel Statman, "Can Just War Theory Justify Targeted Killing? Three Possible Models," in Targeted Killings: 
Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World, ed. Jens David Ohlin Claire Finkelstein, and Andrew Altman(Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012). 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Gross, "Assassination and Targeted Killing: Law Enforcement, Execution or Self-Defence?." supra note 6. 
11
 Ibid. p 328 
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justificatory action against them. Thus, Statman’s appeal to the war paradigm in justifying 
targeted killing fails inasmuch as the act of targeting itself seems to require due process.  
This problem could potentially be solved by positing unequal moral status of 
combatants.
12
 It is at least somewhat intuitive that a terrorist organization maintains a different 
moral status than a nation’s armed forces. Whereas the latter is dedicated to the protection of its 
land and people, the former is dedicated to harming or killing civilians. So where is the injustice 
in presupposing moral guilt of a member of a terrorist organization, especially if such 
membership is voluntary? The problem is that this proposal is very much open to abuse. It would 
effectively pronounce all members of terrorist organizations guilty of whatever crimes or 
atrocities that we attribute to the organization, thus making every member a permissible target. 
Our entire system of justice is based on the premise that guilt cannot be placed upon anyone 
except for what he has personally done and cannot be presumed but must be proven on the basis 
of due process. Proving this guilt requires due process. Simply declaring an individual or group 
of individuals “guilty” flouts a principle upon which our very justice system is built—a very 
dangerous proposition, indeed. 
Any defense of targeted killing as conceived in terms of the war paradigm ultimately fails 
if it cannot succeed in showing that targeting does not require the imputation of moral or legal 
guilt to the target. Such imputation requires due process, thus precluding the option of simply 
killing the target. So the defender of targeted killing must frame the act of targeting in a morally 
neutral manner.  
Making the case for justifiable TK requires the acceptance of three premises. First, the 
context in which targeting is carried out can be characterized as armed conflict. Second, persons 
having the status of combatants in an armed conflict possess a more limited set of rights than 
                                                          
12
 This is the approach taken by Jeff McMahan in “The Ethics of Killing in War,” Ethics 114 (2004): 693-733 
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persons who do not have that status, especially with regard to the right against arbitrary 
deprivation of life. Third, the people targeted have the status of combatants in an armed conflict. 
As argued above, limitation of rights must not be justified by appeal to the morally or legally 
reprehensible conduct of the targets—i.e., to the fact that they are criminals—but rather by 
appeal to their status as combatants. 
III International Law Analysis: Conflict 
 
Justifying targeted killing hinges on the applicability of the armed conflict paradigm. 
Making the case for this applicability requires that we address the question whether it is coherent 
from a legal standpoint to hold that a state can declare war on a non-state organization. 
Defenders of the law enforcement paradigm answer negatively. After all, organized crime is not 
a modern development. Gangs, cartels, and the like have existed for centuries, and never before 
has a government had legal license to eliminate them with lethal military force.
13 
Thus, a defense 
of targeted killing must distinguish cases of organized crime that have been left to law 
enforcement from the non-state organizations that are targeted today. In other words, what is it 
about the non-state organizations that we face today that warrants the stronger hand of armed 
force? 
Geoffrey Corn offers an answer to this question by appeal to Common Articles Two and 
Three of the Geneva Conventions.
14
  These articles provide a triggering mechanism for the 
application of laws of armed conflict. Article Two states “The present Convention shall apply to 
all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of 
                                                          
13
 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, "War Everywhere: Human Rights, National Security, and the Law of Armed Conflict in 
the Age of Terrorism," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 153, (2004). p 717 
14
 Corn, "Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed 
Conflict." 
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the High Contracting Parties.”15 The law of war is thus applicable in a strict sense to 
international war, that is, a military conflict involving two or more nations. Article Three extends 
the laws of war to cases of armed conflict “not of an international character” which occur “in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”16 The wording of this article broadens the 
application of humanitarian norms to conflict beyond the conventional war of nation versus 
nation. This is a necessary and obvious step, as it would be puzzling for combatants to be bound 
by norms in conventional war and yet retain license for any inhumane tactics in a civil war, coup, 
or other such non-international conflict.  
However, the expanded definition of Article Three remains ambiguous with regard to its 
application to certain contemporary forms of armed conflict. On an initial reading, Articles Two 
and Three seem to cover all possible forms of conflict: Article Two applies to conflict 
international in character, and Article Three applies to conflict not international in character. 
However, as Article Three was conceived and has since been interpreted, it does not apply to all 
armed conflict that is not international in character. The Article itself was likely inspired by the 
civil wars that raged prior to WWII in Spain and Russia.
17
 Thus the Article includes the 
qualification that it applies to non-international conflict “occurring in the territory of one of the 
High Contracting Parties.”18 This qualification defined the interpretation of the Article prior to 
                                                          
15
 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members at Sea art. 2, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]  
16
 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
[hereinafter Third Geneva Convention] 
17
 Corn, "Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed 
Conflict." p. 13 
18
 Third Geneva Convention 
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September 11 in such a way that it came to be understood as regulating only internal or intrastate 
conflict. 
19
 
Unfortunately, contemporary armed conflict may fall outside of the scope of either of the 
two Articles. In the case of the War on Terror, the United States is clearly not at war with a state, 
but neither is the conflict necessarily restricted by a single national boundary. Terrorist 
organizations are not concerned with any one particular state, and can move from country to 
country easily. Thus, the tandem application of the law-triggering articles leaves a regulatory gap 
perhaps unforeseen by 20
th
 Century international lawyers. Whether or not the laws of war apply 
to cross-border military operations against non-state actors is a question that must be answered.  
This regulatory gap was exploited by the Bush administration in its defense of the 
treatment of al Qaeda detainees. The administration claimed that the failure of the War on Terror 
to fall into the scope of either Article Two or Three prevented detainees from enjoying the full 
protection of rights offered by the Geneva Conventions.
20
 This stance was challenged in Hamdan 
v Rumsfeld, bringing the problem of the regulatory gap to the fore.
21
 Justice Stevens strangely 
interpreted Articles Two and Three as having a seamless application, stating “the term ‘conflict 
not of an international character’ is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between 
nations.”22By ignoring the qualification in Article Three that the conflict occur “in the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties,” 23 Justice Stevens circumvented the problem of the 
                                                          
19
 Corn, "Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed 
Conflict." p. 13 
20
 Human Rights Watch, U.S. Officials Misstate Geneva Convention Requirements, Jan. 28, 2002, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2002/01/28/us-officials-misstate-geneva-convention-requirements 
21
 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759 (2006 
22
 Ibid. at 2795 
23
 Third Geneva Convention 
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regulatory gap and held that the legal requirement of humane treatment of detainees applied to 
those captured in the War on Terror.  
While the decision in Hamdan largely ignored the standard interpretation of the law-
triggering conditions articulated in the second and third Articles, it did reflect a growing concern 
that all armed conflict, regardless of its nature, should be governed by the Geneva Conventions.
24
 
This concern grew stronger soon after the decision in Hamdan when the world witnessed several 
weeks of combat between the Israeli Defense Forces and Hezbollah.
25
 The fact that this conflict 
did not clearly fall into the law-triggering categories established by the Geneva Conventions did 
not deter the expectation that such conflict nevertheless remained under their jurisdiction. Thus, 
Corn argues for the implementation of a third category of law-triggering conflict, to which the 
Conventions would apply, what he calls “trans-national conflict.”26 He sees this as a necessary 
legal innovation that explicitly clears up any possible existing confusion with regard to whether 
certain forms of contemporary conflict, such as exemplified by the War on Terror, trigger the 
application of the Geneva Conventions.  
The underlying rationale that drives his proposal is the presumption that, to the extent 
that it is possible, laws of war should guide the policy and tactics of all uses of military force. 
The fact that trans-national conflict was not anticipated prior to the attacks on September 11 does 
not preclude the applicability of moral norms on such combat. Regardless of character of the 
combat—whether international, intranational, or trans-national—combatants remain under the 
legal and moral obligation of the laws of war. As Corn argues, this is the very purpose of laws of 
                                                          
24
 Corn, "Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed 
Conflict." p. 32 
25
 Ibid 
26
 Ibid at 33 
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war. Thus, it is the de facto existence of armed conflict that triggers the norms of the Geneva 
Conventions.
27
  
The position that de facto existence of armed conflict is a sufficient condition for the 
application of the laws of war is intuitively pleasing, but carries with it crucial implications. Its 
effect is double-edged. In the first place, ambiguity with regard to the nature of a conflict—i.e., 
whether or not it fits within the traditional Article 2/3 paradigm—is no longer an acceptable 
premise for ambiguity with regard to applicability of the law of war. Thus, one is prevented from 
arguing, as the Bush administration did, that failure of conflict to be characterized as either 
international or intranational allows legal wiggle room with regard to the treatment of detainees. 
As Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch put it, “The U.S. government 
cannot choose to wage war in Afghanistan with guns, bombs and soldiers and then assert the 
laws of war do not apply.”28 It is the de facto existence of conflict—the guns, bombs and 
soldiers—that define armed conflict and invoke its norms. In this way, Corn’s “de facto” 
standard of applicability prevents against exploitation of possible regulatory gaps in the laws of 
war, which certainly counts as a step forward in the protection of human rights.  
On the other hand, inasmuch as contemporary conflict defies traditional categories and 
requires us to put new forms of armed combat under the jurisdiction of the laws of war, we are 
concomitantly compelled to acknowledge that the combatants must be treated as permissible 
targets of lethal force. That is to say, we cannot put participants in conflict under the protections 
of the laws of war without simultaneously exposing them to the more limited form of the right 
against arbitrary deprivation of life that is inherent in warfare.  
                                                          
27
 Ibid 
28
 Human Rights Watch. Supra note 18 
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Amnesty International condemned a missile strike by the United States against al Qaeda 
in Yemen in 2002 by highlighting the seeming impropriety of using military force against a non-
state organization. In their words, “Under existing international humanitarian law, it is not 
possible to have an international armed conflict between a state on the one hand and a nonstate 
actor on the other, should the armed group not form part of the armed forces of a Party to the 
Geneva Conventions. . . . Accordingly, the proper standards applicable to this situation were law 
enforcement standards.”29 Amnesty International sought to utilize the regulatory gap in a manner 
opposite the Bush administration. Because the conflict in question was unlike any to which the 
Geneva Conventions had applied before, they could not be justifiably applied at all, thus 
precluding any hope of invoking an armed conflict paradigm.  
Corn, however, argues convincingly that the evolving character of conflict requires legal 
innovation. By avoiding either innovative interpretations of armed-conflict standards or 
innovations in the standards themselves, we risk outgrowing the relevance of the laws that 
govern conflict.
30
 It is more in the spirit of the Geneva Conventions themselves to argue that 
armed conflict norms apply to any de facto conflict, rather than reserve such norms for interstate 
violence and armed rebellion wholly internal to a state. Whatever reasons may exist for denying 
that certain contemporary forms of military conflict count as “armed conflict” under international 
law, the mere desire to avoid categorical novelty should not be among them. Not only is it 
coherent to treat contemporary trans-state conflict as calling for an armed-conflict paradigm, it 
may be incoherent not to do so.  
                                                          
29
 Amnesty Int’l Yemen: The Rule of Law Sidelined in the Name of Security, (2003) at 23 
30
 Corn, "Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed 
Conflict." p 329 
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At this point, the reader may notice a circularity in the argument. If de facto conflict is all 
that is needed to invoke an armed-conflict paradigm through which we determine an action’s 
permissibility, then any use of military force at any time, under the condition that the force itself 
complies with demands of the laws of war, calls into play the armed-conflict paradigm. In other 
words, firing a missile in Yemen and killing al Qaeda operatives produced the de facto conflict 
that brings into play the armed-conflict paradigm that would justify the missile strike. This 
circular justification is obviously problematic. 
In order to make sense of this seemingly confusing situation, jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello must be differentiated. Whether targeted killing is a justifiable tactic of warfare (jus in 
bello) is one concern, but whether or not the war in which it is used is itself justifiable (jus ad 
bellum) is a very different one. Those who denounce targeted killing in the more particular 
manner as an immoral tactic of warfare must first grant that the context in which it is used is that 
of an armed conflict. However, if one argues that the armed-conflict paradigm is inappropriate in 
the first place, then it is not targeted killing as a tactic that is in question, but whether resorting to 
the use of military force in any capacity is warranted. This is a much broader argument, but not 
an argument against targeted killing per se. 
Proponents of the law enforcement paradigm, then, inasmuch as they object to the use of 
military force, ground their objections in jus ad bellum concerns. That is, the circumstances in 
which targeted killing is carried out do not warrant a military response. In such circumstances, 
all military action including targeted killing is unjustifiable. A moral justification of targeted 
killing, then, first requires a fulfillment of jus ad bellum demands. Without first arguing that 
military force can be used at all, targeted killing as a tactic of warfare has no hope of moral 
vindication.  
14 
 
The strength of Corn’s argument is his emphasis on an adaptable definition of conflict. If 
we insist on maintaining the authority of outdated legal categories, such as the Common Article 
2/3 law triggering paradigm, then we run the risk of legal sclerosis.
31
 Rather than insulate 
ourselves from the evolution of conflict, we should be quick to recognize that the rise of the non-
state organization and its trans-state method of warfare violates old categories in such a way that 
warrants their revision. Furthermore, such innovation is necessary to retain the relevance of the 
laws of war, and thus their status as a recognized authority. Loss of this authority would lead to 
an unregulated battlefield, which would certainly signify a political and moral regression.
32
   
So, with regard to the jus ad bellum issue, whatever reasons proponents of the law 
enforcement paradigm might give for denying the legal status of armed conflict to military 
conflicts involving non-state organizations that operate across borders, the mere fact that those 
forms of conflict do not fit neatly into the Article 2/3 paradigm—i.e., that they are different than 
conventional conflict—should not be among them.  
Additionally, terrorist organizations typically operate in locations where law enforcement 
is severely debilitated or virtually non-existent, while planning acts of violence on innocent 
people in other states, and a military response might be the only viable method for the protection 
of citizens of a threatened state.
33
The fact that a state would have to defend itself against an 
organization rather than another state does not nullify the moral right to self-defense guaranteed 
by Article 51 of the UN Charter.
34
 The morally salient feature of self-defense is that a state is 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid.  
33
 Mark Maxwell, "Rebutting the Civilian Presumption: Playing Whack-a-Mole without a Mallet?," in Targeted 
Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World, ed. Jens David Ohlin Claire Finkelstein, and Andrew 
Altman(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
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 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, 
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being attacked. It would be morally arbitrary to say that a state can only defend itself against 
other states but not against non-state organizations, especially considering the large-scale 
violence that the latter can produce. The fact that international law does not explicitly express 
this speaks only to the fact that the rise of non-state threats to national security is a recent 
development.  
 In conclusion, the invocation of the armed conflict paradigm is defensible. While current 
forms of conflict certainly present new military and legal challenges, a blanket denial that the 
conflicts should be regulated by the laws of armed will have a negative impact on hard-won 
efforts to use international law for the purpose of regulating the use of military force. Thus, it is 
incumbent upon us to recognize and adapt to the evolving contours of conflict.  
IV International Law Analysis: Rights 
 
There are two bodies of norms that dictate the scope of individual rights: International 
Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). While these two 
separate bodies of law have some overlapping norms, they are far from identical, and the 
relationship between the two of them can be difficult to discern. They both seek to protect the 
lives, health, and dignity of individuals, but do so in different ways.  
International Human Rights Law specifies a set of liberties and entitlements that we seek 
to guarantee to individuals merely in virtue of their humanity. These norms are expressed in 
various treaties and conventions and are viewed as an ethical minimum that applies for all and 
for all time. The most pertinent provision of human rights law with regard to the issue of targeted 
killing is the right against arbitrary deprivation of life. Pursuant to this right, a state would be 
barred from killing an individual in the absence of due process, regardless of any supposed 
16 
 
criminal guilt of which he or she may be accused. As previously mentioned, targeted individuals 
outside of the context of armed conflict must be afforded due process. Their protection against 
arbitrary deprivation of life is firmly established in almost every body of IHRL.
35
 
The question discussed in the previous section—whether contemporary conflict, the war 
on terror in particular, qualifies as legitimate armed conflict—becomes increasingly pertinent 
with regard to the application of the demands of IHRL and IHL. International Humanitarian Law 
applies only within the context of armed conflict. Its demands are laid out in the body of the 
Geneva Conventions and in customary international law and are instituted for the limitation of 
superfluous violence and suffering in war to the furthest extent possible. Thus, like IHRL, its 
interest is protecting the liberties and dignity to which humans are entitled, albeit in the more 
limited sense due to its wartime application.  
As I have already argued, defending targeted killing under a law enforcement paradigm is 
all but impossible. Lethal force is only permissible under law enforcement when the life of the 
enforcement official, or an innocent third party, is in immediate danger. Any resort to lethal force 
must fulfill the demands of proportionality and necessity.
36
 Proportionality requires that an 
officer himself, or an innocent party, must be in imminent danger of being killed before applying 
lethal force. Necessity requires that killing is the absolute last resort of the officer. If it is 
possible to arrest or subdue a threat without killing, it is a moral and legal requirement that the 
officer do so. If killing does become necessary, the law enforcement officer must satisfy a 
burden of proof to justify the action. Thus, proportionality and necessity are moral demands that 
aid in providing safeguards against unnecessary death and human suffering.  
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Targeted killing cannot fulfill these demands. By making the elimination of the target the 
very purpose of the mission, there is no consideration of a less harmful method of dealing with 
the threat that terrorists pose. Thus, targeted killing disregards the question of necessity from the 
start.
37
 Furthermore, the question of proportionality is also ignored. By instituting a policy of 
targeted killing, the state makes a tacit assumption that killing terrorists is the only way to 
mitigate whatever threat that they pose.
38
 In this way, targeted killing cannot meet the 
requirements of proportionality and necessity imposed by human rights law under the law 
enforcement paradigm.  
However, if targeted killing can be justifiably held to be carried out within the context of 
armed conflict, the right against deprivation of life is substantially weakened. It would be absurd 
to demand a soldier to prove that every bullet fired is a necessary and proportionate response to 
an individualized threat against him. In war, it is acceptable for a state to adopt a “shoot-to-kill” 
policy against an enemy, despite the violation of human rights that such a policy would pose in 
peacetime. 
The justification for taking another human life in armed conflict requires the satisfaction 
of both jus ad bellum and jus in bello demands. First, jus ad bellum concerns the justification of 
the resort to use of military force. Fulfilling this demand requires, inter alia, the necessity of 
armed conflict—i.e., that no less violent means of neutralizing the threat exists. The necessity 
demand of jus ad bellum is analogous to the necessity demand in law enforcement. Just as it is 
required of an officer to subdue a threat by the least violent means, only resorting to lethal force 
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when absolutely necessary, so a state cannot declare war unless less violent political means are 
determined inadequate to respond to the security threat.  
In my last section, I discussed the unique challenges posed by the novelty of certain 
forms of contemporary conflict, involving non-state organizations in a trans-state scope. My goal 
in that section was to highlight the evolution of armed conflict itself and the need for legal 
categories to evolve alongside it in order to maintain relevance and authority. With regard to jus 
ad bellum, I established only that discussing a justification of a declaration of war should not be 
precluded merely because “state versus non-state organization” does not exist as a category of 
conflict in the Geneva Conventions. Outdated legal categories should evolve to maintain 
relevance to modern circumstances. However, I risk irrelevance myself if I neglect to further 
address the question of whether the armed conflict in which targeted killing is being used, i.e., 
the war on terror, satisfies jus ad bellum demands. 
A proper answer to this question would require extensive discussion on the severity of the 
threat posed by terrorists and viable alternatives to war. I am hesitant to delve into the subject for 
a number of reasons. First, the severity of the threat posed by terrorist organizations is likely only 
known to a handful of government officials. It is reasonable to assume that civilians (and 
philosophers) do not know the magnitude of the terrorist organizations that we fight. We do not 
know the depth or breadth of their influence, the scope of their network, or the potential for harm 
that they wield. Such knowledge would likely require a security clearance and job title that is out 
of reach for most. Furthermore, extensive knowledge of viable alternatives to war that states can 
utilize against terrorist organizations requires a level of expertise in international political affairs 
that I simply do not have. Is there a way that we can ward off the threat of terrorism that does not 
involve resorting to war? If there is, we are certainly under a moral obligation to pursue any 
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alternative that is more humane. However, I am inclined to believe that those who have decided 
that declaring war is the best defense against terrorism understand the inherent moral obligation 
to avoid war if possible. Critics of targeted killing cannot stop at mere condemnation of the act—
they need to provide a viable alternative.
39
 Indeed, it is the very lack of alternative that satisfies 
the necessity demand of jus ad bellum.  
In the end, whether a state is justified in resorting to war or whether there is a viable 
alternative that it must pursue is a political and moral question that demands a political and moral 
answer. From a philosophical standpoint, all that can be definitively stated is that a state is under 
a moral obligation to avoid resort to armed conflict if possible. This is neither profound nor 
particularly interesting, but there remain interesting questions to be answered moving forward. 
So, I will continue my line of reasoning under the assumption that the armed conflict in which 
targeted killing is used is justified.
40
 If it is not, then targeted killing is obviously unacceptable; 
but if it is, then we may address further questions.  
While fulfillment of jus ad bellum allows for targeting enemy combatants, this does not 
license unlimited means of combat. Targeted killing must also fulfill the demands of jus in bello. 
It is important to note that tactics of warfare must fulfill jus in bello whether or not the conflict in 
which they are used satisfies jus ad bellum. However, in pursuit of a defense of targeted killing, 
it is my goal to show that the contemporary conflict in which it is used is itself legitimate (jus ad 
bellum) and that the tactic is defensible as a means of combat (jus in bello). The latter requires a 
fuller explanation of the relationship between IHL and IHRL.  
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If a state is justified in declaring war on a non-state organization, how are we to balance 
the demands of IHRL and IHL? Again, of primary concern is the protection of the right against 
arbitrary deprivation of life, as stated in Article Six of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).
41
 This Covenant, however, is a body of IHRL. A natural way to avoid 
the question altogether is to point out that IHL is the body of law that applies during a time of 
war. The demands of IHRL, then, are irrelevant to policies and tactics in the context of armed 
conflict. On such a view, the lex specialis of IHL fully supplants IHRL.
42
 
However, this interpretation of the relationship between IHRL and IHL runs contrary to 
the accepted jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). According to the ICJ, 
“[T]he protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not cease in 
times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may 
be derogated from in a time of national emergency.”43 The demands of IHRL do not simply 
disappear in a time of war, but the standards may be relaxed to the extent necessary to carry out 
military operations. Thus, a more standard interpretive approach is to reevaluate IHRL demands 
during wartime through a lens of the lex specialis of IHL.
44
 This view of complementary 
application is becoming dominant as warfare moves further away from the paradigmatic state-
versus-state context.
45
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The right against arbitrary deprivation of life remains intact even during armed conflict; 
however, the complementary application of IHL in such times reevaluates what counts as 
“arbitrary”:  
The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be 
determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed 
conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a 
particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be 
considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, 
can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not 
deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.
46
 
Any policy of targeted killing that is implemented during armed conflict satisfies the 
demands of human rights by ensuring compliance with IHL. While execution without a 
trial is an unacceptable instance of arbitrary deprivation of life during peacetime, targeted 
individuals in time of war are not guaranteed due process. Such killing is not arbitrary 
inasmuch as the targeted individual is an enemy combatant and thus subject to the 
inherent violence of war.  
The complementary relationship between IHRL and IHL expresses a key moral 
reality that affects our legal and moral understanding of combat: The act of engaging in 
armed conflict is itself a moral concession. The fact that the less stringent demands of 
IHL make certain actions justifiable in wartime that would otherwise be unacceptable 
shows that, even though human rights must be protected, these are not moral absolutes. 
                                                          
46
  ICJ Adv. Opinion, para. 25 
22 
 
As awful or painful as war may be, it remains recognized as an unavoidable reality that 
requires a modified (smaller) set of protections and entitlements for those who engage in 
it. 
Moral reasoning in matters of war is perpetually drawn between two opposing 
poles: the pragmatic concern of military necessity and the moral concern for human 
rights. Giving full sway to the former results in unregulated violence and cruelty while 
full deference to the latter makes war an impossibility, precluding the state’s ability to 
defend itself. The role of IHL is to strike an appropriate balance between the two, 
permitting a limited degree of violence and human suffering while guaranteeing respect 
for humanity to the greatest extent possible. Obviously, this is not a morally ideal state of 
affairs in the sense that a world without war would clearly be more humane, but in a 
world in which war is a reality, respecting the limitations of IHL while recognizing the 
legality of some violence is the best that can be done. There is no debate that the violence 
inflicted by targeted killing is indeed awful and that such violence would not exist in an 
ideal world, but it remains necessary to evaluate TK by the same rule and measure that 
apply to other forms of combat. Thus, TK is a justifiable tactic if it meets the demands of 
IHL.  
V International Law Analysis: Status 
 
The most serious challenge to the demands of IHL that targeted killing must overcome is 
the fulfillment of the principle of distinction. Distinction is the principle that prohibits the 
intentional killing of civilians by the military, requiring commanders to avoid civilian casualties 
to the greatest extent possible. Crucially, this principle does not prohibit the unintentional killing 
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of civilians. Again, tension arises between the dual moral forces of war: military necessity versus 
humanity. While it is permissible for a military to engage in operations that result in civilian 
casualties, these casualties must be limited to the greatest extent possible consistent with 
achieving the military objective at hand.  
According to Corn, “[D]eliberate targeting of enemy personnel is permitted by the LOAC 
based not on a manifestation of actual threat, but instead on a presumption of necessity derived 
from the determination of status as ―’enemy’.”47 The use of the word “status” here is telling, as 
this is the operative concept that draws the line between justifiable and unjustifiable targeting, 
and thus between arbitrary and non-arbitrary deprivation of life.  
For this reason, distinction comes to the fore in the targeted killing debate, as it is unclear 
what side of the line of distinction between civilian and combatant to put a terrorist. The heart of 
the issue is that non-uniformed, non-state actors and organizations do not neatly fit into the 
categories laid out by the Geneva Convention. In the conventional war context in which the 
Geneva Conventions were written, combatants were easily identified by uniforms or insignia. 
Those who wear a uniform or insignia are entitled to certain rights but are also subject to being 
killed by an opposing military force. Those who do not are civilians who enjoy a broad set of 
entitlements, most importantly that they may not be intentionally killed.  
Again, while these laws were entirely appropriate and necessary after the carnage that the 
first half of the 20
th
 Century brought upon the world, they were ill-suited to govern the conflict 
that dominated the second half of the century and remain ill-suited today. If your wearing a 
uniform or insignia entitles an enemy force to kill you, it is an obvious option for an insurgent 
force to remain in civilian garb. By doing so, the combatant status of those non-uniformed 
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members becomes highly controversial. The Geneva conventions sought to mitigate the 
problems caused by a rise in guerilla and insurgent forces after World War II by introducing 
Protocol I and II in 1977. According to Article 44 of Protocol I,  
. . . combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population 
while they are engaged in attack or in a military operation preparatory to an 
attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where, 
owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish 
himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, 
he carries his arms openly: 
(a) During each military engagement, and 
(b) During such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a 
military deployment preceding the launching of an attack 
 
This legislation does broaden the conception of a combatant so as to include non-
traditional combatants that had begun to appear. By broadening the definition, international law 
recognized that combatants are no longer only those who wear uniforms. As long as an 
aggressing force or individual carries his arms openly during or preceding a military 
engagement, that person holds combatant status. This is surely an improvement in some sense, 
but, as Gross points out, “These regulations tend to obscure rather than sharpen combatant status. 
. . . Protocol I extends combatant status to militants, insurgents and guerillas. What, then, of 
terrorists?”48  
As important as the legal innovations introduced in 1977 were to address evolving 
realities in war, they are nevertheless inadequate to fully clarify the legal status of modern 
terrorists. Those fighting in a non-uniformed, non-state organization are free to choose 
whichever status suits their purposes. They can pick up a weapon and fight as combatants, but as 
soon as they put the weapon down and return home they instantly become civilians and enjoy the 
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protections thereof.
49
 The Geneva conventions only recognize “combatant” or “civilian” statuses, 
but today it seems that this is a false dichotomy, or at least an unfair one. Members of terrorist 
organizations are either combatants who are war criminals or civilians who are ordinary 
criminals. In either case, a criminal has a right to due process.
50
 So, if we frame them as 
criminals, we are not entitled to fight back using the weapons and tactics of war. Again, imputing 
moral or legal guilt cannot do any justificatory work in our application of lethal force.  
One plausible solution to this legal quandary would be to further broaden the definition of 
a combatant. It is intuitively unacceptable that a member of a terrorist organization should enjoy 
a legal safe haven, being subject only to an inadequate and debilitated territorial law 
enforcement, while devising terrorist agenda. But, if we adhere strictly to the legal framework 
that we have inherited, it seems all but impossible to avoid reversion into the law enforcement 
paradigm. If this paradigm cannot be avoided, then the right to due process of potential victims 
of targeted killing cannot be denied.  
Any shift in our legal framework that could possibly allow for targeted killing will 
necessarily be a fundamental, and thus likely controversial, shift in legal categories. But I 
nevertheless argue that such an innovation in law is required to keep pace with the change of 
character of armed conflict. The classical understanding of separation of civilian and combatant 
must remain open to revision. The legal standing of a member of a terrorist organization must be 
called into question. 
The first step towards realizing the necessary innovation in the legal understanding of a 
member of a terrorist organization is noting that terrorists are qualitatively separate from both 
civilians and traditional combatants in philosophically pertinent ways. As long as we feel obliged 
                                                          
49
 Ibid.  
50
 Ibid. 
26 
 
to place them neatly into one category or the other, we will find ourselves led to unsatisfactory 
conclusions.  
First, members of terrorist organizations are not civilians. Civilians have a presumed 
innocence and thus immunity from the violence of conflict (generally speaking), though perhaps 
using “innocence” here is misleading. By “innocence” I do not mean moral or legal innocence. If 
I meant it in this way, then I could only distinguish terrorists by claiming that they are morally or 
legally guilty of some violation of domestic or international law. This would obviously mean a 
reversion to the law enforcement paradigm, requiring due process. Rather, civilians are innocent 
insofar as they abstain from conflict. They do not contribute to a war-making cause, and they do 
no harm to anyone. 
Innocence in this latter sense does not apply to terrorists. By becoming a member of such 
a group, a person actively supports a violent cause. The killing of a confirmed terrorist may be 
controversial in that it is arguably the killing of a civilian, but few would argue that the victim 
was an “innocent” civilian. Membership of a terrorist organization does not necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that the member should be killed—i.e., that justice demands it—but membership 
is surely sufficient for the individual to lose civilian status.
51
 Similarly, merely joining the 
military and putting on a uniform in no way imputes moral or legal guilt. It is never the case that 
a uniformed service member should be killed (again, as a matter of justice) merely in virtue of 
membership, but such membership is sufficient for the loss of civilian status.  
Now it may appear as if I am equating members of terrorist organizations with 
combatants, but there is a further distinction to be made. Terrorists are not combatants in the 
classical sense of the term. The term “combatant” traditionally refers to a uniformed service 
                                                          
51
 Jens David Ohlin, "Targeting Co-Belligerents," in Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical 
World, ed. Jens David Ohlin Claire Finkelstein, and Andrew Altman(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
27 
 
member operating under a chain-of-command. These are the sorts of combatants that were 
around in World War II when the laws of war that govern conflict today were written. Crucial to 
this interpretation of combatant is that uniformed service members are primarily defensive in 
nature. When conflict or a threat to security arises, they submit themselves to the violence of war 
to the extent that is necessary to defend those they have been sworn (or contracted, rather) to 
defend.  
Terrorists do not share this defensive quality with traditional combatants. They join a 
cause that is not only violent in nature, but offensive in nature. They are not interested in 
defending the truly innocent civilians of the region in which they fight, but rather seek shelter 
among those civilians in order to carry out violence among other truly innocent civilians. So, 
whereas a traditional combatant is only a threat and subject to the violence of conflict when 
actively engaged (as Protocol I stipulates), terrorists remain a threat regardless of their 
engagement in conflict at any given time. If the purpose of the organization is to carry out violent 
acts against innocents, their very existence can be interpreted as aggression, regardless of the 
success of their endeavors. In contrast, the mere existence of, say, the Canadian army does not 
pose a threat to innocent civilians. Thus, members of terrorist organizations are distinguishable 
from the classic understanding of a combatant. In many ways, their exploitation of status laws, 
combined with their targeting of civilians and devious methods of doing so, make them much 
more dangerous than the typical combatant that current law would readily identify. And if this is 
the case, then the way in which we define a combatant, even the non-traditional combatant that 
Protocol I addresses, is inadequate to capture the full extent of then the meaning it is intended to 
encompass.  
28 
 
It is important to note that a terrorist acting individually cannot constitute a threat worthy 
of the invocation of self-defense by a nation. Rather, it is the organization as a whole that poses 
the threat to which a state may respond with force.
52
 An organization will retain something like a 
command structure and infrastructure necessary to coordinate its efforts and attacks, which 
further likens it to a military force.
53
 If a terrorist is merely a civilian without connection to a 
more powerful and dangerous organization, then no principle of IHL would permit the targeted 
killing of that person.
54
 However, if the person can be linked to the operations of a terrorist 
organization, then targeted killing becomes a justifiable course of action.  
Linking the individual to the organization becomes a tricky matter as we attempt to 
formalize the link. Legal options for linking apply explicitly to either conventional combat or 
criminal action—neither of which map neatly onto the issue of terrorism. Principles used to link 
individuals to organizations in an armed conflict context include direct participation in armed 
conflict, co-belligerency, or military membership.
55
 If any of these indeed apply to terrorists, it 
would not be without a liberal interpretation. Direct participation has a temporal limitation 
wherein the individual can only be targeted for that time in which he is actively engaged in 
combat. Co-belligerency and military membership only apply to states and traditional military 
members (those who wear uniforms and insignia). Complicity and conspiracy are concepts in 
criminal law that link individuals to more dangerous organizations, but it is difficult to imagine 
how we might utilize these concepts without invoking a law-enforcement paradigm. Again, 
traditional legal categories are inadequate to address the concerns and realities of modern 
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combat. Liberal interpretation or new legislation is needed to maintain the applicability and 
authority of law.  
I argue that our understanding of a “combatant” should be expanded so that membership 
in a terrorist organization is a sufficient condition for that individual to lose civilian immunities. 
A member of a terrorist organization can be safely assumed to be either actively engaged in 
violence or planning future violence. If terrorist organizations cease to do either, they cease to be 
terrorist organizations. It is not the case that mere membership makes one guilty of war or 
domestic crimes, but rather that such membership undoubtedly exhibits one’s willingness and 
intention to engage in conflict, to which counter-engaging is an entirely rational and acceptable 
response. Thus, membership is a justifiable linking principle by which a state may equate the 
targeting of an individual to an act of armed conflict against an organization that poses a 
legitimate threat.
56
 
It could be argued that using membership as a linking principle is far too “status” 
oriented and thus violates the temporal limitation included in Additional Protocol I. This 
Protocol was written to clarify when the law may consider an individual who is not part of a 
conventional uniformed military to nevertheless be considered a combatant. A crucial component 
of this legislation was the temporal limitation that only allowed fighting these combatants “for 
such time”57 as they are directly participating in hostilities. In such cases, combatant status is 
conferred in virtue of the person’s conduct—participating in hostilities.  
It is important in this context to maintain the moral barrier between conduct and status. 
During war, uniformed military members are targetable in virtue of their status, but no such 
status applies to civilians whose direct participation in conflict may be quite limited. Inasmuch as 
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terrorists are not uniformed military members, targeting them cannot be status-based, as 
Additional Protocol I stipulates. This is a difficult hurdle to clear for the defense of targeted 
killing.  
But, as Jens David Ohlin points out, the dividing line between status and conduct is not as 
clear-cut as we may wish it to be.
58
 One could take a hardline approach and assert that conduct-
based targeting only allows for targeting such individuals who personally display a direct and 
imminent threat of violence, perhaps only those with a finger on a button or trigger. This would 
set the moral bar high, but would render a state’s military defense all but impotent. Finding such 
imminent threats and responding to them in time is impracticably difficult. A less stringent 
standard would plausibly admit membership in a terrorist organization as an instance of conduct 
which warrants military response. It is the conduct of the individual, the choice to join the 
organization and to actively participate in the planning and execution of its agenda, that nullifies 
civilian immunity. Members of organizations are able to join and quit as they will, which 
preserves the temporal limitation that Additional Protocol I emphasizes.
59
  
However, because of the asymmetric nature of conflict with terrorist organizations, they 
have utilized the strategy of blending in with a civilian population. Just as they are not 
conventional combatants, so will we not be able to engage in conflict with them in the 
conventional manner.  
Targeted killing is arguably the most effective strategy for counter-engagement. Steven 
David outlines a few of the major advantages of targeted killing in the context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. He explains that it is nearly impossible for Israelis to defend each of the 
thousands of potential targets of Palestinian terrorists (airports, stadiums, government buildings, 
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etc.). “In such situations, the best response to terrorism is to eliminate the threat before it can be 
launched. One of the most successful means of eliminating terrorists before they can strike is 
targeted killing.”60 He points out that terrorist organizations are built around a few charismatic 
leaders and those few people with the technical skills needed to create whatever devices they use 
to carry out their plan. By eliminating these few key people, the organization suffers a substantial 
loss that is not easily replaced. Furthermore, Israeli forces often inform a particular member of a 
terrorist organization that he is being targeted. This will cause the member to turn himself in or 
flee—in either case, the threat he poses is diminished.61 The effectiveness of targeted killing is 
also emphasized by Charles Dunlap when he points out the movement of Al-Qaeda to Yemen 
from Central Asia: “The reason is not because an allied ground operation drove them out, and 
not because some clever ‘hearts and minds’ campaign made them feel unwelcome in the Hindu 
Kush, but rather because of the persisting application . . . of air strikes from Remotely-Piloted 
Aircraft.”62 The emphasis on the importance of targeted air strikes lies in stark contrast with the 
ineffectiveness of conventional ground tactics. That is to say, if we plan to counter-engage the 
terrorists, the most effective way to do so is with targeted air strikes.  
As I mentioned before, targeted killing must not be conceived in a way that imputes 
moral or legal guilt. If targeted killing must be used as a tactic of warfare, it cannot be viewed as 
killing for vengeance or retribution. This is not an impossibility. If we are willing to concede that 
membership in a terrorist organization is a sufficient condition for combatant status and 
acknowledge that the most viable option for combating this threat is with targeted killing, then it 
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is not a stretch to conclude that targeted killing must be an acceptable tactic of warfare as it is 
carried out today.  
 “Naming names” is no longer a matter of imputing guilt to an individual. Rather, as 
Gross puts it, “Naming names . . . establishes affiliation in the same way uniforms do.”63 The act 
of targeting merely serves the purpose that wearing a uniform traditionally serves. So, whereas in 
conventional warfare those who wear a uniform may be subject to lethal force by an opposing 
military, so today those who are identified via sources of intelligence as combatants (as I argue 
the term “combatant” should be understood) may be targeted.  
 This view of targeting also distinguishes targeted killing from assassination. David points 
out that “philosophical and political norms against assassination have been even more influential 
than written law.”64 But he goes on to argue that “war—or armed conflict—is a legal license to 
kill whether it is targeted killing or more traditional combat.”65 The brute fact of the matter is 
that, if we can hope to engage a non-uniformed, non-state enemy force, we cannot go about it in 
a conventional manner. “Insofar as Israel and other states make war on terrorism, traditional 
norms of combat will have to change.”66 If we yet seek to oppose targeted killing as a viable 
tactic, “critics of this approach need to provide an alternative.”67 
VI The Waldron Objection 
 
Jeremy Waldron argues that accepting a principle that permits targeted killing (which he 
calls “  ”) is a dangerous tool in the legal toolbox of any political leader. He says, “We should 
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consider whether we are comfortable with    in the hands of Al Qaeda or Hamas or some state 
that sponsors activities of the kind those organizations engage in.”68 He argues that a principle 
like    cannot be interpreted neutrally—or at least, that believing that it can be interpreted 
neutrally is misguided. Realistically, if    is a viable and accepted principle, then it will be 
exploited by those who seek to use it for morally questionable purposes. They can be abused not 
only by terrorist groups and tyrannical governments, but also by some democratic governments. 
He goes on to cite several examples of morally unacceptable uses of power by democratic 
governments in the 20
th
 Century.
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Waldron’s view is that we should instinctively shy away from any principle that allows 
for deliberate killing, especially when there is no due process. This is the default position from 
which we start and against which any proposed principle such as    must make a strong 
counterpoint. In this vein, he argues that the principles of just war—such as the principle of 
distinction, or    —have only come about because centuries of armed conflict have proven our 
default position to be unviable. Principles like distinction have come about in response to the 
inevitability of war. If we must make war, let us at least do so in the most civil possible manner. 
So, the principles that guide our war-making are moral concessions that are valid in light of the 
sociological fact of human violence and conflict. Viewed in this light, any attempt to separate a 
guiding principle from the historical context in which it was developed is highly problematic. 
Simply imposing a new moral principle of war,   , is a dangerous proposition by virtue of its 
lack of historical backing (at least compared to the long-observed principle of distinction).
70
   
My first objection to Waldron’s argument is that it is possible for any guiding principle of 
warfare to be abused by an ill-intentioned political actor. The mere fact that one could potentially 
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abuse a norm or law does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that such a law must be rejected. 
It is possible to abuse social assistance programs, but that does not mean that we should therefore 
reject them. Perhaps that is a bad example, for it may be morally acceptable to abuse a law that is 
meant to actively help people whereas it might not be acceptable to abuse a law that permits the 
killing of certain people. However, killing in self-defense is a principle that allows for the taking 
of a life. Should we abandon this principle because of its potential abuse?  
Waldron responds to this point directly. His counterargument is that, yes, the principle of 
self-defense is just as open to abuse as any other legal principle, but that is the reason we implant 
a mechanism for ensuring the appropriate application of the principle for every case in which it is 
utilized. “In a well-functioning legal system, every single action using deadly force on this 
ground is subject to intense, immediate and sustained investigation by the police, and charges are 
brought in a great many such cases where there is serious doubt whether the criteria for self-
defense have been properly applied.”71 
Waldron’s acceptance of self-defense rests on the grounds that there is a mechanism for 
reviewing its application. While it may be subject to abuse, such abuse is very likely to be 
substantially mitigated by our law enforcement and legal procedure. My objection to Waldron’s 
argument is his tacit presumption that no such mechanism for review is applied to targeted 
killing. Methods for reviewing the process of targeted killing do not exist in as robust a form as 
the method for reviewing use of lethal force for self-defense in domestic law. However, it is at 
least conceivable that, just as the invocation self-defense can be used to justify killing if certain 
criteria are met in a criminal court, so could instances of targeted killing be required to meet 
standard international criteria. The fact that no such standard criteria exists explicitly in 
international law today should not lead us to conclude that permitting targeted killing is the first 
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step down a slippery slope. Indeed, it is already the task of the Human Rights Committee to 
investigate and report violations of human rights. If targeted killing were not performed in 
accordance with high standards of identification, the issue would no doubt be raised by that 
Committee and others more directly affected. Accepted standards must be open to careful 
scrutiny.  
Furthermore, killing in self-defense and targeted killing alike are morally defensible 
whether or not there exists a legal process to investigate and scrutinize their application—a 
process of review is not a necessary condition of their moral acceptability. If there existed a state 
in which no process of investigation into instances of killing in self-defense has yet been 
instituted, it would be absurd to assert that, because of the lack of such processes, people in that 
state no longer have the right to defend themselves with lethal means, if necessary. In the same 
way, the lack of a formal process of review for the use of targeted killing, while problematic, is 
not ultimately condemning of the tactic. Just as one who kills in self-defense is morally justified 
whether or not there exists a process to scrutinize its application, so targeted killing can be 
justified even though its application is not (yet) formally scrutinized. Although, in any case, a 
formal review process is certainly desirable.  
My second objection to Waldron’s analysis is his refusal to acknowledge the changing 
character of war. Waldron argues that a principle such as    (principle of distinction) comes to 
be acknowledged as a guiding principle due to the unviability of its alternative, absolute 
abstention from killing, which is sociologically apparent.
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 So, armed conflict is accepted as an 
inevitable reality which we must do our best to humanize. This is all well and good, but if he 
rests his understanding of guiding moral principles of war on historical realities, then would it 
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not follow that changes in the character of war could lead to changes in accepted moral 
principles?  
The principles that guide warfare today are those that we have inherited from a tradition 
of war dating back to the Greeks in which war is carried on out a battlefield by uniformed 
soldiers. In this context, the guiding principles of armed conflict work well, but the character of 
the armed conflict has fundamentally changed. The enemy is not necessarily found on a 
battlefield, but rather among the civilian population. So, if the enemy is to be fought at all, the 
classic “battlefield” paradigm must be modified, and the principles that guided conflict in that 
context should remain open to revision.  
 Innovations in legal paradigms and norms keeping pace with innovations in warfare are a 
recurring theme on every level of analysis. While such legal evolution is necessary, the potential 
for a moral misstep is at its greatest. Waldron’s objection should always loom above the head of 
both the legislator and military commander. The acceptance by many of targeted killing as a 
tactic of modern warfare signals a fundamental change in warfare itself—one which should not 
be lost on those who engage in it.  
As Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks points out, we are entering an age of “war everywhere.”73 As 
she argues, declaring war against a non-state entity, while perhaps not itself a morally flawed 
proposition, is fraught with potential for abuse.
74
 The line between civilian and combatant is 
blurred and must be redrawn. The geographical scope of the battlefield, being no longer limited 
by national boundaries, becomes nebulous at best and requires moral redefinition. As we recast 
the guiding principles of war for a new age, we must be careful to do so with preserving 
humanity—the limitation of human suffering—as a guiding principle. While a certain degree of 
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armed conflict is justified for a nation to protect itself against the threat posed by non-state 
organization, there remains the potential for abuse, drawing our lines too broadly, and giving 
license for military action, in certain places and against certain people, where there ought not to 
be any. Waldron’s objection may not warrant an absolute cessation of targeted killing, but it 
certainly offers a stern and necessary counterpoint to its advocates.  
VII Conclusion 
 
 I have argued that armed conflict between a state and a non-state organization is 
legitimate armed conflict, worthy of regulation by the Geneva Conventions. Because non-state 
organizations are capable of inflicting great violence on the population of other states, potential 
victim states retain the moral right of self-defense against them. The inadequacy of law 
enforcement in the regions in which these organizations operate leaves the state with no other 
option but military action, which fulfills the necessity requirement of jus ad bellum. Once 
engaged in armed conflict, the right against arbitrary deprivation of life for participants in the 
conflict is reinterpreted through the lens of IHL. Thus, targeted killing does not violate human 
rights if the individuals targeted can be classified as combatants in armed conflict. This is not a 
conceptual stretch, considering the fact that non-uniformed personnel can be considered 
combatants for such time as they remain a threat, according to Additional Protocol I. 
Membership in a terrorist organization is sufficient to assume that a person is willing to actively 
engage in violence against others when the established criteria, as well as the methods by which 
we establish that criteria, are confirmed. As long as a person remains a member, that person 
poses a threat of violence against which a state is entitled to defend itself.  
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 The defense of targeted killing is challenged chiefly on two fronts. There is a jus ad 
bellum concern of necessity that asks whether armed conflict generally, and targeted killing 
specifically, are truly necessary for national security. If the threat to national security could be 
mitigated by less violent means, then resorting to war would be an unacceptable course of action. 
This point has interesting implications for the threat of a global area of conflict. Namely, as long 
as lack of law enforcement lends to the justification of targeted killing in some regions, targeted 
killing would be unjustifiable in regions wherein no such lack exists. That is to say, terrorists 
cannot be targeted in regions in which arrest is a truly viable option.  
 The other front of challenge to targeted killing is the jus in bello requirement of 
distinction. Members of terrorist organizations are not military personnel, so arguing that they 
nevertheless retain a combatant status is a conceptual hurdle that targeted killing must clear. I 
have argued that membership in the non-state organization that poses a threat is sufficient for the 
loss of the protections of civilian status. Thus, membership links the individual to the 
organization that bears the threat against which the warring state defends itself. While this 
linking principle is conceptually satisfying, it depends heavily upon sources of intelligence in 
order to establish membership. Defining criteria by which we identify and confirm members of 
terrorist organizations is a task saturated with moral implications. While this is troubling enough, 
the issue is compounded when the established criteria, as well as the methods by which criteria is 
confirmed or denied in each case of targeting, are shielded from public scrutiny. Making such 
information public would inevitably give distinct advantage to terrorists, so it remains 
confidential.  
 It is this secrecy that many understandably find disagreeable, if not unacceptable. The 
answer to this issue lies in a moral analysis liberty versus security—a debate too complex for the 
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scope of this thesis. However, while accountability to the public is a democratic ideal that should 
be maximized to the greatest viable degree, it should simultaneously be recognized that security 
could demand the confidentiality of certain knowledge, such as the means by which a state 
identifies and targets terrorists. At the very least, we can conclude that the moral education of 
military officers and federal agents is of paramount importance for respecting moral obligations 
in times and places in which nobody is looking. 
 In the end, targeted killing is an innovative tactic of warfare that can be justifiably used 
against an equally innovative enemy. However, while it may be justifiable in principle, its 
implementation must be scrutinized at every level. For all my argument, I have only managed to 
move the debate over to a new set of questions. What standard do we appeal to when we declare 
an individual as a terrorist? How sure must we be? What if we are wrong? It seems that 
Waldron’s objection still looms above—we must move forward with utmost care that the tactics 
and principles we establish are not unduly prone to abuse by future political and military leaders. 
But to deny our ability to adapt tactics and legislation to the existing realities of armed conflict is 
unacceptable from a practical, as well as moral, standpoint. 
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